

# EXHIBIT B

[Senate Hearing 113-293]  
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

S. Hrg. 113-293

MISMANAGEMENT OF POW/MIA ACCOUNTING

=====

HEARING

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND  
CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

of the

COMMITTEE ON  
HOMELAND SECURITY AND  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

-----  
AUGUST 1, 2013  
-----

Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.fdsys.gov>

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs

-----  
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
82-747 WASHINGTON : 2014

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,  
<http://bookstore.gpo.gov>. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-0912, 202-512-091800, or 866-

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

- |                                      |                             |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman |                             |
| CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 | TOM COBURN, Oklahoma        |
| MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              | JOHN McCAIN, Arizona        |
| MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          | RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin      |
| CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           | ROB PORTMAN, Ohio           |
| JON TESTER, Montana                  | RAND PAUL, Kentucky         |
| MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  | MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming    |
| TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             | KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire |
| HEIDI HEIKAMP, North Dakota          |                             |

- Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
- John P. Kilvington, Deputy Staff Director
- Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
- Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
- Lauren Corcoran, Hearing Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

- |                                      |                             |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri, Chairman |                             |
| CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 | RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin      |
| MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              | JOHN McCAIN, Arizona        |
| MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          | MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming    |
| MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  | KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire |
| TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             |                             |

- Margaret Daum, Majority Staff Director
- Rachel Weaver, Minority Staff Director
- Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk

C O N T E N T S

-----

Opening statement:	
Senator McCaskill.....	Page 1
Senator Ayotte.....	3
Prepared statement:	
Senator Ayotte.....	27

WITNESSES  
Thursday, August 1, 2013

MISMANAGEMENT OF POW/MIA ACCOUNTING

Major General Kelly K. McKeague, Commander, Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command.....	5
Major General W. Montague Winfield, Ret., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, and Director, Defense Prisoner.....	6
John A. Goines, III, Chief, Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory, U.S. Air Force.....	7

Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Goines, John A., III:	
Testimony.....	7
Prepared statement.....	44
McKeague, Major General Kelly K.:	
Testimony.....	5
Prepared statement.....	30
Winfield, Major General W. Montague, Ret.:	
Testimony.....	6
Prepared statement.....	41

APPENDIX

Chart referenced by Senator McCaskill.....	47
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, prepared statement	48
Vietnam War POW/MIA, Ann Mills Griffiths, prepared statement....	50
National Security Commission, The American Legion, prepared statement.....	53
Capability and Capacity Assessment of the Defense POW Executive Summary Report.....	59
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:	
Mr. McKeague.....	83
Mr. Winfield.....	114
Mr. Goines.....	120

MISMANAGEMENT OF POW/MIA ACCOUNTING

-----

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2013

U.S. Senate,  
 Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight  
 of the Committee on Homeland Security  
 and Governmental Affairs,  
 Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.  
 Present: Senators McCaskill and Ayotte.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL

Senator McCaskill. This hearing will come to order, and I apologize for my cold before I begin. I will try not to sniffle or cough into the microphone too much today.

We are here today to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of prisoners of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) accounting.

Our Nation has made a commitment to service members and their families that we will obtain the fullest possible accounting for the missing and recovery of remains for those who died serving our country. Today, the Defense Department estimates that there are about 83,000 missing U.S. personnel from past conflicts, including World War II, the Cold War, Vietnam, Korea, and the Persian Gulf War.

Over the last 5 years, Congress has appropriated nearly \$500 million for this effort. In 2012 alone, this amounted to over \$132 million, approximately \$50 million more than the previous year. Those added funds were intended to ensure that the Department had every resource it needed to increase its capacity to account for 200 missing persons by 2015, a requirement set by Congress in 2009.

On average, however, the accounting community has identified and accounted for only 72 previously missing personnel per year. Although Congress has more than doubled the overall budget of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), over the last 5 years, the additional funds have not yet yielded any significant increase in identifications.

We cannot put a price tag on this mission, but we can and must ensure that hundreds of millions of dollars that taxpayers have earned are being spent as efficiently and effectively as possible.

According to a recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Defense Department's capacity to account for missing personnel is, "being undermined by longstanding leadership weaknesses and a fragmented organizational structure." In addition, disagreements and lack of communication between the various Defense Department commands and offices involved in the accounting mission have harmed the Department's ability to improve its capacity as required by Congress.

GAO also identified significant duplication and overlap between JPAC and the Defense Department's Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), and between JPAC's Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) and the Air Force's Life

Sciences Equipment Laboratory (LSEL).

The Subcommittee has also reviewed an internal report regarding JPAC's internal operations. This report, which was prepared at the request of JPAC's commanders by a Fellow hired by JPAC's Central Identification Laboratory, found that JPAC's Research and Analysis Division was so mismanaged that it risked, ``total failure'' of JPAC's mission. It called the Division's processes acutely dysfunctional and also found that JPAC had wasted or abused taxpayer funds on travel and, ``military tourism.''

This report was banned by the former commander of JPAC and its findings did not become widely known until earlier this summer. These findings are deeply disturbing. However, since announcing this hearing, the Subcommittee staff has heard from nearly a dozen current and former members of JPAC, DPMO, and experts in the accounting community who have questioned this report's independence and its accuracy.

I wish to state clearly at the beginning of this hearing that the Subcommittee does not have a dog in this fight. I am not here to take the side of JPAC, the DPMO, the Central Identification Laboratory, or Research and Analysis. I am here to give a loud wake-up call to everyone involved that it is time to put your squabbles aside for the good of the mission and the good of our Nation. It is unacceptable for dysfunctional bureaucracy to impede our efforts to bring closure to the families of missing personnel.

To all of those in the accounting community who work every day to find the missing, to identify remains, and to bring peace of mind to families, I thank you. You should be proud of the work that you do, and you should serve as an example to those throughout the chain of command whose pettiness, negligence, or willful ignorance allowed these problems to develop and remain uncorrected for so many years.

I hope by the end of this hearing we will understand more about the issues the accounting community is facing. I intend to raise some hard questions, including: How many of the missing personnel can reasonably be recovered and identified? And what will it actually cost to achieve this mission? We need to get these numbers straight. The family members of the missing deserve honest answers about what is feasible.

What we may not know is how quickly the Department can fix these problems. I assure you that both here in this Subcommittee and in the Armed Services Committee, I intend to stay on this until they do.

I thank the witnesses for being here and I look forward to their testimony.

I am pleased today to be joined by Senator Ayotte, whom I serve with on the Armed Services Committee. My Ranking Member could not be here today, so she is sitting in that seat and I could not be more thrilled with that, and I will now turn it over for her comments.

#### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE

Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. It is an honor to be here with you this morning, and I enjoyed it when we had the opportunity to be the Chair and Ranking Member on the Readiness Subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee.

I think since we both serve on not only this Committee but the Armed Services Committee, I want to echo your commitment to making sure that we address the problems that have been identified by the internal report, by the GAO report, and that this must end, to make sure that we can do what is right for those that we have left behind and bring them home. So it is an honor to be here.

As you know, the Soldier's Creed includes the following words: ``I will never leave a fallen comrade.''. These words, memorialized and memorized by our soldiers, are just as true for our entire Nation. Coming from a military family, and as I mentioned, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I am determined, as I know the Chair is as well, to make sure that our Nation does not waver from this solemn vow.

That is why today's hearing is so important. We have a solemn duty to recover the remains of our service members who made the ultimate sacrifice in distant battlefields to preserve our freedoms and our way of life. They have earned our enduring gratitude and stand as a lasting model of patriotism and courage to us all, and their sacrifice has directly contributed to the freedom and safety that we all enjoy today. That is why it is important that we live up to the words on the POW/MIA flag: ``You are not forgotten.''

According to the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, we cannot account for over 73,000 Americans who served in World War II, 8,000 who served in the Korean War, 125 in the Cold War, and over 1,600 in the Vietnam War. There have been 37 American POWs since 1973 and all have been returned except one, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. In my home State of New Hampshire, we are still waiting to learn the fate of six service members from the Vietnam War and 43 from the Korean War who remain unaccounted for.

We entrust the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command to work on behalf of the American people to fulfill our moral obligation to find and bring home the remains of American heroes who served overseas. In light of the great trust that we place not only in you, General McKeague, but in each of you, I am incredibly disturbed, as the Chair has mentioned, with not only the internal findings of the report that was done within the DOD, but with the recent GAO report, and I think the Chair hit

it well when she talked about the leadership weaknesses identified in the GAO report.

But what bothered me most was reading about the petty squabbling between the three agencies which each of you has been charged with leadership. That is not the way we do things, and we owe it not only to those fallen heroes that we need to bring home to their families and to the American people that the squabbling end, that we get to the bottom of this, that we understand that the resources that have been given to you that, as the Chair mentioned, have increased, but the outcome has either stayed the same or decreased in terms of bringing our fallen heroes home, that we can do so much better.

Having served on the Armed Services Committee and hearing about the disputes between your agencies, it really troubled me. So we have to get to the bottom of this, and I want a commitment from each of you that this squabbling will end, that we will work together, that we will drive efficiencies to make sure that we are all working for the same result, and that is to bring our fallen heroes home, to be honest and truthful with their families, to make sure that their families know that they are not forgotten.

And so the reports, they raise serious questions. I know the Chair will have many important questions for all of you, as will I. And I want to thank each of you for being here today. We need to walk out of here knowing--I know this will be one hearing, but I think this will be one of many to make sure that we get this right. Thank you.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Let me introduce our witnesses. Major General Kelly McKeague is the Commander of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, which supports the Department of Defense personnel accounting mission in analysis, search and recovery, and laboratory investigations. General McKeague assumed command in October 2012. General McKeague began his military career serving as a civil engineering officer in various assignments in the U.S. Air Force. He has also served as Chief of Staff and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard matters.

W. Montague Winfield is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs and Director of the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. He is responsible for leading the national effort in the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing as a result of hostile action. In addition to having served his distinguished 31-year Army career, Mr. Winfield was also the first Commanding General of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command.

John Goines is the Chief of the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory.

Thank you, all three, for being here. It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear all witnesses that appear before us, so if you do not mind, I would ask you to stand and take the following oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

General McKeague. I do.

General Winfield. I do.

Mr. Goines. I do.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you all very much.

General McKeague, we will begin with your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL KELLY K. MCKEAGUE, \1\ COMMANDER,  
JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

General McKeague. Good morning, Chairman McCaskill, Senator Ayotte. It is a privilege to appear before you today, and I respectfully request my written testimony be included for the record.

-----  
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McKeague appears in the Appendix on page 30.  
-----

When I took command of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command almost 10 months ago, I realized that JPAC could be operated more efficiently and effectively. Since then, my team and I, in concert with DASD Winfield and all our partners in the personnel accounting community, have worked hard to improve how we account for our missing Americans from past conflicts.

The weight of our sacred obligation, as you mentioned, Senator Ayotte, is no better captured than in a remark a sister of an Army helicopter pilot missing in Vietnam recently shared with me. She said, "The vast majority of the families who are involved have tremendous trust in your mission and in those who work our cases." As JPAC's Commander, I have the distinct honor to lead a talented and dedicated team of professionals.

Our noble mission is global in scope, with investigations needing painstaking research, recoveries challenged by inhospitable environments, and tougher identifications demanding a world class scientific enterprise. As responsible stewards of Federal funding, we are continuously seeking efficiencies and optimizing cost effectiveness.

In addition to optimizing our three mission sets, much of my focus over the past 10 months has been to improve communication, coordination, and collaboration, both within the Command and with our external partners, to ensure JPAC is structured to effectively and efficiently accomplish our mission, to establish processes which will sustain and improve the organization and mission into the future, and to provide a

quality work environment for the men and women of JPAC.

Unquestionably, there are areas within JPAC that offer opportunities for improvement and we make consistent efforts to identify and address these areas. Given the complexities of our worldwide mission, it is clear we must continue to strive to improve our efficiencies and performance. Still, sequestration and a civilian hiring freeze and furloughs do present us with steeper challenges.

However, I am confident JPAC's professionals will sustain our priorities with fewer resources and balance requirements to meet mission objectives. Most importantly, we will not waver in our commitment to the families of our mission heroes, our veterans, and the American people, which is a moral imperative of the fullest possible accounting of those who lost their lives in service to this great Nation.

Prominently on a wall in JPAC's headquarters is President Calvin Coolidge's sage advice: ``The Nation which forgets its defenders will be itself forgotten''. The dedicated men and women of JPAC endeavor to see that this never happens.

Madam Chairman and Senator Ayotte, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you, and more importantly, for your support of this noble and critical mission. I welcome the questions you might have.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, General.

Mr. Winfield.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL W. MONTAGUE WINFIELD, RET.,\1  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POW/MISSING PERSONNEL  
AFFAIRS, AND DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING  
PERSONNEL OFFICE

General Winfield. Chairman McCaskill, Senator Ayotte, thank you for the opportunity to speak about what the Department of Defense is doing to improve the Department's efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for our missing DOD personnel and provide answers to their families. I look forward to discussing the responsibilities of the various members of the Department's accounting community as well as the specific collaboration between the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, and the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command.

-----  
\1 The prepared statement of Mr. Winfield appears in the Appendix  
on page 41.  
-----

Based on my experience as the first Commander of JPAC, I came to my current position well aware of the challenges I would be confronting. I know that the Department's personnel accounting communities suffer from organizational and structure weaknesses which have been cited in other reports and studies. Many of these structural flaws relate to the primary problem recently identified by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

Over the past year, Major General McKeague, Mr. Goines, and I, along with others in the personnel accounting community, have made significant strides to improve our unity of effort. But this is an issue that clearly needs further work.

As I strongly recommended, the Department has begun the process of implementing all nine of the GAO recommendations. Some of the issues raised in the internal draft JPAC Efficiency Report may require additional attention and investigation. In fact, last week, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy requested that the DOD Inspector General initiate an immediate investigation into the allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse. Additionally, the Under Secretary requested that the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), undertake a review of the organizational structure the Department employs to accomplish this critical mission. Fortunately, the GAO has helped us identify in a thorough and objective manner what the Department needs to do to improve our performance of the sacred mission of accounting for our missing personnel.

I would like to describe recent and upcoming activities regarding missing personnel. Last week, our Nation commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice at Arlington Cemetery, where the President took the opportunity to recognize the family of a missing service member whose remains had been just identified.

Next week, I will be hosting the Department's annual meeting for family and members of American service members missing from the Korean War and Cold War. We expect approximately 430 family members from across the country to attend the 2-day meeting that we will have the opportunity to brief them on our efforts and to account for their missing loved ones.

On July 12, I led a meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah, where we sat down and briefed 80 family members of missing service members from World War II, from the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Likewise, I had the great honor to address the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in July, as well as the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia in June. Major General McKeague was with me at all of these meetings.

I know he agrees that the families and our key external partners are as determined as ever to help us improve the way we account for our missing personnel, and just as importantly, to help us improve how we provide answers to their questions. Many of our families realize that we may never find our loved ones. But they look to us to help them understand what

happened, and they do not want us to give up. It has been made clear to me that not knowing the fate of a missing loved one is as painful as never bringing them home.

With that in mind, the lessons and experiences we have learned from our families and veterans have helped us shape the Department's view on how we account for those in Iraq and Afghanistan and how we support their families. I believe that with the support of Congress, the Department of Defense is taking steps to address longstanding challenges to efficiency and effectiveness in the personnel accounting community.

Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.

Mr. Goines.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. GOINES III, \1\ CHIEF, LIFE SERVICES EQUIPMENT LABORATORY, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. Goines. Good morning, Chairman McCaskill and Senator Ayotte. I am John A. Goines III and I currently serve as the Chief of the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio.

\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Goines appears in the Appendix on page 44.

The Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory was established in 1983. Its function was to investigate problems associated with life support equipment and resolve issues related to Air Force mishaps. More than 30 years later, its mission support continues to expand to meet taskings from the Department of Defense, the Armed Services, and those of allied foreign nations. We occupy some 13,000 square feet in Building 17 at the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center and fall under Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

It is a unique facility within the DOD, and based upon comments received from numerous international visitors with regard to equipment studies and mission diversity performed, it is in all likelihood the only equipment laboratory of its type anywhere in the world.

In 1988, the LSEL mission evolved from the LSEL Chief, who was approached by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), to examine equipment artifacts recovered in Southeast Asia to determine the feasibility of accounting for personnel based solely on the equipment. The LSEL conducted investigations, studies, and instructional programs related to a very broad range of military equipment, which are defined as life sciences equipment.

In 1993, the LSEL was tasked by Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become a support agency of the Joint Task Force Full Accounting, renamed the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, in 2003, and subsequently other agencies, including the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office. This resulted in the establishment of a dedicated LSEL POW/MIA mission, which is manned by specialists whose work involves the accountability of missing Americans from conflicts like the Indochina War Theater, the Korean Conflict, the Cold War, and the worldwide theater of World War II. Although the mission coverage is complex and challenging, the staff remains dedicated to enhancing aviation safety, sustaining and improving this Nation's military resources, and accurately resolving the status of our missing personnel for their families.

Within this context, since 1994, the LSEL has supported 194 POW/MIA cases and has accounted for the presence of 206 missing individuals out of 349 being sought. On average, the LSEL supports 10 cases per year, with an annual operating budget of \$250,000.

The LSEL staff consists of a cadre of specialists who have extensive background in numerous types of life sciences equipment types deployed by American military services. Through the use of comprehensive technical library and a large collection of equipment reference exhibits maintained by the LSEL, the analysts endeavor to match submitted artifacts to the type of equipment and specific systems from which the artifacts have originated from, identify its service applicability as well as the time period it was used. Further testing can then be applied, often employing state-of-the-art equipment along with the full resources of other laboratories and specialists at the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center to enable artifact identification to be confirmed.

Finally, all equipment and scientific test results are translated into determinations about the presence of missing personnel. Accordingly, an identified artifact, like a piece of air crew flight suit, can help reconstruct the pattern and type of its host structure, reveal information about which military service utilized it, disclose other details about when it was used and with what aircraft, until, along with all other artifacts and damage assessments, it provides an overall image of what the evidence supports about its previous user and their probable status.

Based upon such work, the LSEL and staff are totally dedicated to the resolution of the POW/MIA issue and to supporting other agencies involved in this highest national priority endeavor, to fully account for our Nation's missing personnel.

I thank you for the opportunity of providing opening remarks and I await any questions that you have for me at this

time.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.

I think there are three major areas that I would like to try to get covered today. One is, who is really in charge and is the structure appropriate? Second, what are we going to do about the infighting and the turf battles? And third, have we set realistic goals and are we using taxpayer dollars in the most efficient way possible?

Let us start with the leadership question. I have to tell you that as I began preparing for this hearing, echoes of Arlington began resonating with me, because when we looked at the problem at Arlington National Cemetery, there was a lack of oversight that was really bred by no one being in charge. It was very easy to finger point because there was not a clear chain as to who was responsible.

And I will put this chart\1\ in the record, but I want to hold it up because the interesting thing about this is every red box has a role. Look at that. I mean, is it any wonder that this is a mess?

-----  
\1\ The chart referenced by Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 47.  
-----

And the frustrating thing about this is that back in August 1993, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs issued a report, and I am going to read from the report. ``The U.S. Government's process for accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia has been flawed by a lack of organizational clarity, coordination, and consistency.'' That was 20 years ago. The notion that we are at that same place now is just a real head-scratcher for me.

Last year, the House Armed Services Committee pointed this out. GAO points it out. So what can you tell me about the Department's plans? It is my understanding that all of you, really, if you look at it, the only person you have in common that you report to is, in fact, Secretary Hagel, is that correct? Does anybody disagree with that assessment?

General Winfield. Senator, I agree with you.

Senator McCaskill. OK. By the way, none of you are in the same down boxes here, and there are a lot of layers between you and Secretary Hagel. What can you tell me about plans to change this ridiculous organizational structure that is supposed to be working on a very focused problem? It is not like this problem is disparate. It is not like we are talking about, lift needs for the Air Force or we are talking about logistic needs for the Army. We are talking about locating the missing remains, which involves, obviously, science, it involves personnel, it involves cooperation of the various branches, but if we do not get this fixed, they are going to be back here in 20 years yelling at you guys.

So, tell me, General McKeague, what are the plans right now for reorganizing this in a way that we can hold somebody accountable?

General McKeague. Chairman McCaskill, as you know, the GAO, that was their first recommendation of the night, was to look for the Department to consider some sort of consolidation. I do not look at this necessarily from the standpoint of this being--we all have different roles. My role is clearly the operational arm of the accounting community. I do not delve in policy. I do not delve in notification to families. But I know my partners do. And so I can assure you that as part of the Department's implementation of the GAO's recommendations, recommendation No. 1 will be looked at seriously.

Senator McCaskill. Well, what does that mean?

General McKeague. I think we will---

Senator McCaskill. Who is looking at it, and what is the timeline?

General McKeague. Dr. Miller--this is more for DASD Winfield, but I will answer what I know. Dr. Miller has instituted a review of the GAO recommendations. As you know, the Department has accepted eight of the nine and a partial concurrence of the ninth, and we are implementing many of those recommendations. Some of them have already been implemented. And I would view the consolidation question to be at the top of the list.

Senator McCaskill. OK. That is not completely reassuring to me, and I will followup with Dr. Miller for a timeline. But I think we need to know what the specific response to the recommendation is going to be. And this is not something that should take 2 years to study. This is something that somebody ought to be able to tell us, we are going to look at the organizational structure and we are going to make recommendations for change by this date, and that is what I am looking for.

Do either of you have any input on a date specific that we can look for some kind of plans to--and I get that we all have different missions here, but you cannot argue with the fact that even within your command, you have two departments that are fighting like 12-year-olds.

General Winfield. Senator, if I may, the Department has, in fact, accepted all of the recommendations from the GAO. And in response to the GAO and also the internal JPAC report, the Under Secretary of Defense has directed that two reviews be conducted. First, he has directed that the DOD IG take a look at all malfeasance. Second, he has directed that CAPE takes a look at the organizational structure of this organization, of the entire accounting community.

He has not put a timeline on exactly when we will have the

results of these reviews, but I will assure you that it is not going to be a very extended period.

Senator McCaskill. OK. Well, you can--and we will--I am sure that Senator Ayotte will join me in a letter to Dr. Miller. Dr. Miller needs to know, we need a date----

General Winfield. Yes, ma'am.

Senator McCaskill [continuing]. Because we are going to hold him accountable to the date. And I think we will also direct the letter to Secretary Hagel, that this is something that demands some of his attention to get this thing straightened out once and for all.

And it is not that I do not think you guys are not capable of working with each other. But the problem, the accountability piece of this--and this is what we found over and over in Arlington--that when there is a problem, it is way too easy for you guys to fade with a finger pointing. Well, that is CIL, or that is over in DPMO, or, oh, that is in JPAC. If we get this concentrated with some kind of very clear chain of authority, then we will do a much better job of making sure that we are not getting excuses as opposed to real problems that we need to help you solve.

I have a lot of other questions, but I will turn it over to Senator Ayotte now.

Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chair, and let me just followup on what Senator McCaskill just asked about.

The 2010 Defense Authorization, in fact, directed this very issue. In fact, it asked the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive, coordinated, integrated, and fully resourced program to account for missing persons. I mean, that is an excerpt from it right there. Section 541 set a goal of asking for this plan, a comprehensive, coordinated plan, be submitted so that we could accomplish, as you know, recovery of 200 remains each year to bring back to their families.

And one of the things that the GAO identified was the fact that because of the problems with the organizational structure and the disputes, that, in fact, as I understand it, JPAC and DPMO actually developed competing plans. Is that right?

General Winfield. Senator, based on information that we received from both of our predecessors, we know that to be true.

Senator Ayotte. OK. So, here we have where we have already, as a Committee, said in 2010 that, clearly, a plan is needed, and now the Chair has already identified that this goes back 20 years where this very same issue has been raised, and you can understand why we hear this today with no deadline, thinking, when is something going to change, because if we do not receive the coordination and plan that has already been asked for 20 years ago, was asked for clearly in 2010, with no deadline for how this structure is going to change, and you both have competing plans as to who should be in charge and how it should work, this has just got to stop.

And I will join the Chair in this letter because I think Secretary Hagel has to focus on this, as well, and make sure that we receive as soon as possible what the new organizational structure will be of one that eliminates the squabbling, that eliminates the competing plans, makes a decision that is going to accomplish what all of us want to accomplish in bringing the remains home.

So, can you both tell me about these competing plans? Have the two of you communicated about these competing plans, and have you yet at your level as leaders--and, by the way, General, I know you have not been in this command long and you have adopted many of these issues, so you have a real opportunity, as well--all of you do--to set this right. But have the two of you gotten together on these competing plans and talk through what you think as leaders of DPMO and as JPAC what should happen?

General Winfield. Senator, a couple points. We talked about a timeline. There is one portion of the timeline that Dr. Miller has put in place. He set a 90-day limit on the response of the review. After the review is actually conducted, obviously, the final decisions would have to be made. I can, in fact--when you talk about competing plans, again, when we--I have been in the position a little over a year, and when we both assumed our positions----

Senator Ayotte. So you are relatively new to this, too, as well.

General Winfield. Yes, I am. There is only one plan that was on the books, and that was a plan that requested resources. And of the two plans that you are referring to, the JPAC plan was the one that was agreed to.

So, when we talk about competing efforts, the first thing that I was directed to do and agreed with my boss, Dr. Miller, was, first, to bring the accounting community together. The second thing he asked me to do is increase transparency. The third was to support the GAO.

Immediately upon taking my position, we established a planning group. It was a joint planning group that had members of all of the accounting community, and their goal was to take a look at creating the capacity and capability of this plan which gets at the requirement that has been levied upon us. The requirement is to increase our capacity and capability by 2015 with a subsequent requirement to eventually be able to identify 200.

It is important to note that there is no immediate return on investment. If we are funded to increase our identifications, there is a long process. First of all, there is a lot of research and analysis that is conducted, followed

by an extensive research or investigation of the specific area, the lost area. Then there is a recovery, and often times it might take more than one investigation, more than one recovery. And, finally, it goes to the lab for identification. So it takes time before there is a return.

Senator Ayotte. And certainly, Mr. Winfield, I do not dispute that this process takes time in terms of the proper recovery of these remains. But I do not see, unless we get at the fundamental structural issues that the Chair has raised so that we are all working together instead of spending the time we are duplicating resources or not having clear chains of authority, how we could possibly reach the goal and most effectively do this on behalf of the American people.

Would you agree with me on that, that if the structural barriers are there, if people are not all working together in the best way, then how--obviously, no matter what time it takes in terms of the processes, then we are not going to be able to effectively achieve that. Would both of you agree with me on that?

General Winfield. We have done an extremely good job at unity of effort. We work together on a daily basis. I communicate with Major General McKeague every day.

Senator Ayotte. Well, let me just get at a more fundamental question. Do you disagree that with the way things are right now, you have had these two competing, obviously, that came up through DPMO and JPAC to address the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). You have seen the organizational structure. Do you agree that things need to change in the organizational structure to make sure we get this right?

General Winfield. Senator, we agree with the recommendations that were made by the GAO that there is a need to take a look at our organizational structure.

Senator Ayotte. So, just a look.

General Winfield. Again, it is important that the review is conducted, and CAPE is going to take a good look and a review and an assessment of our organizational structure.

Senator Ayotte. See, here is what worries me. You have been looking and looking---

Senator McCaskill. For 20 years.

Senator Ayotte [continuing]. For 20 years, and it is just very evident--I thought the Chair's point was well taken that the lines of authority here do not make clear authority, so that would be the most efficient way to drive the results, as identified in the GAO report and identified 20 years ago and, obviously, focused on in the 2010 NDAA, and I am sure many others that we did not pull up today.

So, we can keep looking and looking, but we need to go beyond looking. We need results, and that is why we are so concerned about driving a date on this of making sure that we get an outcome, of not just--I mean, I do not want to be here in the Defense Authorization asking the very same questions without some results, and I am sure neither of you do, either. So, that is what--when I hear ``look,'' it really raises flags for me.

And, General, I do not know if you have a comment. I know my time is up, but---

General McKeague. Senator, if I could. The competing plans were back shortly after the NDAA was introduced and the goal was established. There were competing plans for resources. I can assure you that there are no competing plans today. We have an integrated plan. DASD Winfield took the lead on a capabilities and capacity plan for 2014. It included all of the partners. And I would also clarify that the cooperation and coordination between JPAC and DPMO, the two largest partners within the accounting community, has never been better. I have complete trust in DASD Winfield. As he said, we communicate almost daily. And I do not see competing plans in today's construct.

Senator McCaskill. I just think it would be helpful if you had the same boss. I just think it is confusing, and I will just tell you that I know you guys are going to take a look at it, and I know it is very hard to make changes in the organization. Speaking from a lot of experience in the contracting field, we actually managed to get a contracting command opened because of the severe problem.

I think there are two ways to get this reorganized, you all doing it in the way you think is best or us doing it for you. And I can assure you that Senator Ayotte and I will do it for you if you cannot do it yourself, because we need to know who the boss is.

I do not know if you are at fault or you are at fault, and you do not even report to the same people. So your boss may be telling you ``A'' and your boss may be telling you ``B,'' and then you guys are down here trying to work it out. It just does not make sense.

Let me talk about some of the infighting within JPAC, General McKeague. Does CIL have operational responsibilities at all?

General McKeague. Yes, ma'am. They are the identification operations arm of JPAC.

Senator McCaskill. So, both research and analysis and CIL have operational responsibilities?

General McKeague. They both work for me, ma'am.

Senator McCaskill. OK.

General McKeague. There are three mission sets within JPAC. There is the searching for, research, and analysis. There is the recovery, led by our investigations recovery teams. And then there is the identification part, led by the Central

Identification Lab.

Senator McCaskill. Other than the personal attacks in Paul Cole's report, do you think his analysis of the dysfunction within JPAC is accurate?

General McKeague. Ma'am, I would say that we do have issues in terms of efficiencies. I think Dr. Cole was astute in pointing out that we needed to improve our procedures and efficiencies, and we have. And I would say that he also was very helpful to us in talking about the need to improve the production of leads.

Senator McCaskill. Were there parts of the report that you thought were inaccurate?

General McKeague. Ma'am, I would disagree with some. For instance, archival research was nonexistent. I would disagree with that. That we had a stagnated operations plan and that there were multiple visits to Southeast Asia sites that were not justified, those are just some of the things I would disagree with.

Senator McCaskill. We have heard, the Subcommittee--and I am going to talk about the whistleblowers, but we have also heard numerous complaints regarding CIL's management. After hearing from so many people with the same complaints, we kind of had to wonder if there really is a significant problem with the management at that part of your command. There are also apparently a very high number of discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints that are pending. What is your take on that, General?

General McKeague. Ma'am, when I first arrived 10 months ago, I found that we were in desperate need of attention toward communication, collaboration, and coordination. There was disunity within the command. That has been my priority, to unify the command. It has been my priority to improve morale, and I believe that we have improved it. Are there squabbles between the approaches that both divisions take? Absolutely. But I think we can provide those in a professionally enhanced environment to be able to resolve those without bomb throwing and finger pointing.

Senator McCaskill. I want you, and we will have questions for the record, but I do want you to keep us posted on the progress of how you feel that you are solving the problems within your command, because it appears--as we began down this road, we assumed that the Cole report was being squashed because the Cole report was critical. Well, now as we have looked at it, part of it is that there was such wide disagreement within your command as to whether the Cole report was ginned up by Mr. Holland in order to try to make the other two parts of your command look bad, that this was all about promoting one part of your command at the expense of another part of your command because there was this squabbling going back and forth.

I hate it that we are getting into this level of micromanaging within your command, but this all floated to the surface when we began planning this hearing. I mean, we answer the phone and we listen, and it was shocking, the amount of input we were getting. I mean, frankly, on the whistleblower stuff, I mean, our phone just started ringing off the hook, and the complaints were both about DPMO and JPAC, both where you work, Mr. Winfield, and where you work, General McKeague. We are getting a lot of whistleblower complaints about retaliation about whistleblowing.

Would both of you address the large number of claims of retaliation within your offices.

General McKeague. Ma'am, if I could address the part of--you are asking for a commitment from me to keep you apprised. I can assure you that I will keep you apprised of the progress we make.

I will share with you--and Senator Ayotte, you may know this--our mutual friend, Bill Reddel, put me in touch with the Arbinger Institute. It is a management consulting firm that looks at responsibility, collaboration, and influence. Bill Reddel, who is the Adjutant General of New Hampshire, has adopted Arbinger principles. I brought Arbinger in look at this exact same problem because, again, it is something that I saw firsthand that we--all the most talented scientists in the world, the most astute researchers and historians in the world would be totally ineffective if there was no trust, if there was no acceptance of personal responsibility, and if this was just a matter of everybody blaming everybody else, and that has been my focus, to get at it, to improve the morale and the environment within JPAC.

Senator McCaskill. Well, I realize this is a little bit of pot calling the kettle black because we do way too much of that and try to make the other guy look bad around here rather than coming together and working together, so I realize that there are a lot of people watching this hearing who would go, ``Well, they have a lot of nerve.''

But, that aside, it is--you have a choice when you are a leader. You can either lead by making the other guy look bad and, therefore, you look better, or you can lead by giving the other guy credit and communicating and then everyone does better. And I think what you have had in JPAC is the former and not the latter and I know you know you have a ways to go.

General McKeague. Madam Chairman, I would agree with you, and I would also say that, just as you pointed out, we are all inextricably linked. The laboratory needs a functioning, effective research and analysis section just as much as research and analysis needs a fully functioning, effective laboratory. That is the irony, is everybody agrees that this is

a passionate--this is a mission that they can be passionate about, and I share that passion. What they cannot agree is the approach on how to achieve and fulfill that passion.

Senator McCaskill. I am going to briefly go on to Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) fellows and then I will save my numbers questions for the next round, but I want to, if you would allow me, Senator Ayotte, I am confused about the ORISE Fellows. We began looking at the Fellows and it appears to me--are you paying Oak Ridge or the Department of Energy (DOE) for these Fellows?

General McKeague. Ma'am, ORISE is an arm of the Department of Energy, so when we transfer our funding, it goes to the Department of Energy through ORISE.

Senator McCaskill. Are they making money off this?

General McKeague. ORISE?

Senator McCaskill. Yes. Is the Department of Energy making money off this?

General McKeague. Yes, ma'am. There is an 18 percent overhead.

Senator McCaskill. So---

General McKeague. Our annual payment to DOE through ORISE is \$3.5 million, of which 18 percent for fiscal year (FY) 2013 is overhead.

Senator McCaskill. So why do you not just do the Fellows directly and save the 18 percent?

General McKeague. Ma'am, I am not sure. This is a program that has started back in the 1940s. DOD is the largest recipient of ORISE Fellows. It is intended to advance the scientific enterprise. We use them with great results. We use them for projects and research in niche requirements within the laboratory.

Senator McCaskill. Why do we not just hire really good archaeologists and scientists? Why are we paying an 18 percent overhead to another Department of government?

General McKeague. Ma'am, it is actually a bargain from the standpoint that they do not receive a salary from us. They are actually---

Senator McCaskill. Who are they receiving a salary from?

General McKeague. They are actually paid a stipend, on average, about \$80,000.

Senator McCaskill. But, who is paying that? Is that the Department of Defense is paying that?

General McKeague. No, ma'am. I believe it is ORISE. We just transfer the funding. But the bottom line is---

Senator McCaskill. You mean the Department of Energy is paying it.

General McKeague. I am sorry, Department of Energy.

Senator McCaskill. Well, taxpayers are paying them.

General McKeague. Yes, ma'am.

Senator McCaskill. OK. We are going to take a close look at this. We are going to ask your cooperation for the record---

General McKeague. Yes, ma'am.

Senator McCaskill [continuing]. Because if it has been there since 1940 and there is an assumption you are getting a bargain, I do not like the idea that one Department of government is paying another Department of government an 18 percent hit on locating and hiring people who are doing work for the government. Just because it has always been done that way does not mean it is the right way to do it, and I need to see a cost-benefit analysis as to why we are getting value out of that 18 percent, because they are not working at the Department of Energy, right?

General McKeague. No, ma'am.

Senator McCaskill. They are working full time in Hawaii, right?

General McKeague. Yes, ma'am.

Senator McCaskill. How many of the Fellows have been extended past the 5-year deadline?

General McKeague. Ma'am, if I could take that for the record.

Senator McCaskill. OK.

General McKeague. We have currently 41 on our rolls right now.

Senator McCaskill. Yes.

General McKeague. And it provides a great recruiting and retention opportunity for us, as well, because in addition to the fact that we do not have them long-term, we can evaluate whether or not they would perform admirably as a full-time forensic anthropologist or archaeologist.

Senator McCaskill. OK.

General McKeague. And their stipend is still significantly less than what we would be paying them as a civil servant.

Senator McCaskill. OK. Well, that is what I want to get to the bottom of.

General McKeague. We will get you the information.

Senator McCaskill. But you understand, when we start to look at it, I am going, wait. Well, what is this? And I know that they are supposed to have been graduating within 5 years, and Mr. Cole had not been in school in 20 years, and there were all kinds of issues about is this a way that you can get people hired that people know as opposed to getting the best and the brightest through this program. So I would appreciate those questions for the record.

Sorry, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Ayotte. No, that is fine.

Getting back to the question that we had initially on the organizational structure and implementing the GAO's findings, I know that Dr. Miller is looking at this issue, and have you

briefed Secretary Hagel on this issue, as well, because I do believe that this is an issue that needs a fire lit on it from the top to make sure that we are really driving this and we are not ending up in the same position. So I do not know if you have had an opportunity, General or Mr. Winfield, to brief the Secretary on this.

General Winfield. Senator, I obviously have weekly conversations with Dr. Miller, but I would have to take for the record any conversation that he may have had with the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Ayotte. No, I am just trying to get at it, because we are going to--we will direct this up to the Secretary level and, obviously, talk to Dr. Miller, as well, because I do believe that this has to come also from the top to make sure that we resolve these issues.

I know that Senator McCaskill had asked you, General, about the internal Dr. Cole report, and one of the things that troubled me about it, I understand that there was a lot of internal dispute about the validity of it and why some of the criticisms were in it and did people have other motivations.

But your predecessor, Major General Tom, his response to that report was telling to me. It really stuck out for me, because he sent that memo saying it was hereby disavowed and rejected in its entirety, that I do not find any merit in any of the conclusions or recommendations, and that there would be no further copying or sharing of the report, and concluded by saying the command will not consider any allegations, findings, or recommendations from the report.

And I believe that Senator McCaskill had asked you about the report itself. Do you agree with that, that there is nothing valid in that report that we can take some lessons from, putting aside the motivation of it?

General McKeague. Senator, before I answer that question, Madam Chairman, if I could clarify. The ORISE program was actually in 1992. I misspoke with adding 50 years to that. But, by all means, we will get you the information that you require.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you.

General McKeague. Senator, toward your question, I believe that we have implemented recommendations from Dr. Cole's report. Three I would like to highlight which I think are bearing fruit for us is the fact that we established an Investigation Decision Board to review field investigations that would come forward--to review research that would come forward as to whether or not it should qualify for a field investigation.

We also reorganized the command and now we have most of our--not most, but all of our supporting deploying personnel under one division. They work investigations and recovery for the actual field missions.

And the last thing I think was a positive from Dr. Cole's report is that we implemented adding a scientist, either a forensic anthropologist or archaeologist, to every field investigation team that went out, to look at the site, to map the site. In addition, we have assigned a military leader to help with logistics.

So those are just three examples of things we have already implemented that were recommended within Dr. Cole's report.

Senator Ayotte. Because that was a fairly defensive response of just saying, no, we are not going to consider anything in it. So I do appreciate that you have looked at it with the eye of how can we improve.

General McKeague. Absolutely.

Senator Ayotte. The one issue that was raised in it that stuck out with me, as well, was this idea of military tourism. And, in fact, one of the examples in the report identified the--I have no doubts that in order to recover remains from World War II, that you have to travel to Italy and many other places in Europe. But one had highlighted an incident in which three JPAC teams spent five nights in a luxury hotel, superior hotel in Rome, that was more than \$500 a night. And when it was combined with the per diem to stay at this Hotel De La Minerve cost more than \$18,000 for taxpayers.

So, have you looked at that piece of it, too, as well, in terms of how taxpayer dollars are being used with the necessary travel that I do not dispute that JPAC needs to take in order to effectively recover remains?

General McKeague. Ma'am, I cannot speak to that specific incident. However, I will tell you that as part of Dr. Miller's review of the draft JPAC internal report, the DOD Inspector General will be looking at all allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse within that report.

Senator Ayotte. OK.

General McKeague. Toward today, if I could fast forward, we have strict controls in place that prevent that from happening. Our operational planning function is led by our Director of Operations, a neutral party. They endeavor to have at least two operational planning teams that are made up of functional representatives from throughout the command to develop the mission set. There is then a decision brief that goes in front of my deputy to look at country coordination, to look at fiscal responsibility, to look at all issues regarding permitting. And then it finally comes to me for a confirmation briefing.

So I believe, today, we have multiple levels of control whereby other aspects within JPAC, functional aspects, are involved in the decisionmaking process as to whether or not we are expending taxpayer dollars to advance a mission, whether it be an investigative one or a recovery one.

Senator Ayotte. And is this process something you have put

in place since you have come into this command?

General McKeague. No, ma'am. It was put in place by my predecessor and I have just increased it and improved it as we have gone along. It is a constant reevaluation, a self-assessment. We have after-action reports after the teams come back. We determine, what did we miss in the operational planning function, and we then adjust.

Senator Ayotte. Well----

General McKeague. It is a continuous improvement process.

Senator Ayotte. And I hope that you will review the examples, the one that I just identified and others in there, to do an after-action report to make sure that taxpayer dollars were being used responsibly so that any corrections can be made that those types of things do not happen again.

And I wanted to also ask, with regard to resourcing for what you have received with regard to JPAC. As I see it--and also with DPMO--certainly, you have seen some pretty significant increases. In fact, if you--let us put aside, obviously, where we are now with sequestration. But if you look from 2008 to 2012, for DPMO, it has been about a 26 percent increase. For JPAC, from 2008 to 2012, it has been a 93 percent increase. And I think that reflects the commitment that Congress has to wanting to make sure that there are adequate resources for the recovery efforts here.

But then if I look at the numbers of remains that are recovered, there is not a reflection of the increase in resource. As I look at the numbers of remains recovered by 2008 and 2012, it ranges from 62, 71, 74, 94, and 82. But there really does not seem to be the consistent increase in that piece of it along with the increase in resources.

So, I think this resource issue of what you need for resources--I know that my time is up and I know that the Chair was going to ask about this, but I would like to get your perspective on, with the additional resources we have invested in this, how come we have not already seen--is it as a result of some of the issues identified in the GAO report, seeing better results, and what are we going to need going forward? So, I know that is a broad question and I know the Chair will probably have a number of questions in this area, but I think it is important that we get at these fiscal issues.

General McKeague. Ma'am, our baseline budget in 2012, when the additional resources were added, was \$71 million. Today, in fiscal year 2013, it is \$89 million, and there was additional growth built in through the appropriation from Congress as endorsed by the Department where, over a 5-year plan, we were going to be added 253 personnel as well as \$314 million additional dollars to our program. That has hit a speed bump because of the fiscal environment we face, but we are confident that with the balance between smaller resources as well as what we need to do and how we need to optimize our efficiencies and effectiveness, that we will be able to do so.

Senator McCaskill. So, you are saying that, essentially, you have not seen a huge increase in resources?

General McKeague. Madam Chairman, DASD Winfield alluded to this earlier in his remarks. There is a lapse time, a lead time between, A, training the people before they go out. The average forensic anthropologist needs anywhere from 9 to 12 months before they can go on a field mission. So there is a lead time for that. There is a lead time for the research and analysis. There is a lead time for the recovery. And then, obviously, once the remains come into the laboratory, it can range anywhere from several weeks to, in many cases, decades--in some cases, years or decades. Last month, we just identified a set of remains that were returned to us in the early 1990s from North Korea.

Senator McCaskill. Let me ask you this. Do you feel confident, both Mr. Winfield and General McKeague, that you are going to be able to identify significantly more remains in the coming 2 to 3 years? I mean, will you get above 100? Will you get to 200? Do you believe you can do that?

General McKeague. Ma'am, I think a realistic goal for us, which would be attainable, would be a 10-percent per year increase. If we were to do that, we could be at 125 identifications within 5 years. I believe that is a realistic goal. I believe we will have the resources, even with this fiscal environment, by which to achieve that.

Senator McCaskill. Mr. Winfield.

General Winfield. Madam Chairman, in order to make an identification, numerous members of the accounting community will have to contribute to that particular effort. We have made several strides that will allow us to increase our effectiveness and efficiency to identify more individuals.

For example, our Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL), have increased their technology where they need smaller portions of remains in order to make a DNA match. When we go talk about our Service Captured Officers (SCOs), they have made improvements on how we look for the family members in order to get the family reference samples.

In our organization, you mention an increase. In 2010, we formally were given World War II as a portfolio. That is where the increase began. That is where we added some personnel. And, again, we will begin seeing and reaping the benefits of that very soon. But it is impossible to put an exact timeline on that.

So, I think there are a lot of things moving in the right direction to ensure that we are working toward our goal as efficiently and as effectively as we possibly can.

Senator McCaskill. I think you all understand, in this

environment, if Congress does not start seeing an increase in the numbers of remains identified, that the money will go away. It just is too hard to find the resources for what we need to be doing in the Federal Government that we would substantially increase resources for a given problem that does not result in more productivity.

Let us talk about the reasonableness of the numbers and how honest and open we are being. This is difficult, because no one wants to give up on anyone, and we feel very strongly about that as a Nation. I know the current number is 83,000, and my understanding is 80 percent of that, 73,000, is World War II. And it is my understanding from preparing for this hearing that you all have estimated that as many as 58,000 may not be recoverable with current technologies, and 40,000 were lost over deep water and will never be recoverable.

Do you believe I have stated those numbers in an honest and forthright way?

General Winfield. Madam Chairman, several groups have attempted to determine exactly how many of our missing or unknowns are going to be reasonably recovered. What is important to note is that we have a requirement from Congress to create a case file on each of our missing from World War II. We have been working on that. We have about 20,000 at this point and we are going to continue to work that. Once we have a case file on each individual, we will be able to make a good assessment on how many of those will be recoverable, if you will. So the analysis will be done and we will be able to give you a very accurate figure in the near future.

Senator McCaskill. Well, is the number correct, that approximately 40,000 were lost over deep water?

General Winfield. To the best of my knowledge, that is correct.

Senator McCaskill. And do we know who those 40,000 are?

General Winfield. We do have names. We have a list of everyone that was missing from World War II.

Senator McCaskill. And do we know which of those individuals were lost over deep water?

General Winfield. We do, indeed.

Senator McCaskill. And have we been, do you believe, honest and forthright with the families about the chance of recovering those remains, the 40,000 deep water?

General Winfield. We have not released specific names. That is one of the recommendations from the GAO, is to create that case file and then prioritize the list based on the probability of being able to recover those remains.

Senator McCaskill. Why do you think that we have been as reluctant as it appears we have been to be reasonable and honest with these families? What favor are we doing them? If we know the names and we know it was over deep water and we know they are not recoverable, why would we not rush to be honest and forthright with these families?

General Winfield. Ma'am, I had the exact same question when I assumed this position, and as I started researching it, what I was told was there are a lot of families still holding out hope. I mean, we say that they were in a ship, if you will, and the ship went down. There are families who believe that there may be inaccuracies on who physically was on the ship, if you will, and there has been a reluctance to tell the families that there is no hope that we are going to find your loved one or be able to bring the remains back home.

I will tell you that one of my agendas is to---

Senator McCaskill. It seems cruel to me. That just seems cruel to me---

General Winfield. And, Madam Chairman---

Senator McCaskill. And I do not think that the POW/MIA community is unwilling to receive the factual information that you have to the best of your ability. I mean, at some point in time, is it more cruel to not be honest and forthright that the chances of recovering half of the number that you have all been tasked with is somewhere close to none from slim? I disagree that you are doing these families a favor by not being honest and forthright about it.

General Winfield. Madam Chairman, I agree with you totally---

Senator McCaskill. Then who is keeping you from doing it, us?

General Winfield. No, ma'am. What we have to do is validate the information that was provided by the Army Graves Registration Service and other services. Once we make that validation, we are certainly more than willing to provide that information to the families. What we do not want to do is to say there is hope and then return a year or two later and say, no, there is no hope. So what we want to do is to be accurate in our assessment, and that is what we are going to do. That is one of my main objectives, is to do just what you have described. Once we do the analysis, once we have collected the information---

Senator McCaskill. So you say you are going to wait until you have done all of them before you tell any families?

General Winfield. Absolutely not, ma'am. As soon as we get the information on these--as we start working the case files, we are going to be in a position to be able to give families information about their loved one.

Senator McCaskill. And when will that begin?

General Winfield. We have already started the process of accumulating the information. The charter that was given to us by Congress is to collect all the information that we have on each of our missing from World War II. The baseline for that,

and we are looking at all of the files from those that were lost and now we are bringing all of that information together. As we do the assessment of that, we are going to start providing the information to the families.

Senator McCaskill. Senator McCain and I have discussed this, and I am going to meet with him when we return in September to talk about this, but I feel a sense of urgency about getting accurate information to these families as quickly as possible and I have a feeling that sometimes the bureaucratic need to finish a task, combined with pressure from Congress, has inadvertently put way too many families in a cruel limbo when we could fix that in short order.

And I am going to try to help with that, to whatever extent I can, because you have a lot of work to do that needs to be done. If we know that there is work that is impossible to do, the sooner that we deal with that, the better.

General Winfield. And, Madam Chairman, we are working toward that end. We do just that for the Southeast Asia Conflict or the Vietnam War. We have categorized them. We are in the process of doing the same thing for the Korean War. It is just a matter of getting to it, and again, as I mentioned earlier, it was 2010, NDAA 2010, that formally added World War II to our portfolio. So, we are behind. The most mature of our efforts, of course, is Vietnam. This is where it all started.

Senator McCaskill. Yes. OK. Senator Ayotte.

Senator Ayotte. So, right now, in terms of family members, how do they receive information on someone that they have lost? Do they have to contact you? Do you contact them? How does that happen right now?

General Winfield. Yes. There is a procedure. Again, this is an accounting community effort in pretty much the entire process. The communications is done by the Service Casualty Officers. We will pass the information to them and they will make the presentation to the families. If they have questions, the families have questions, information will be passed through the Service Casualty Officers and passed to us. We do the research, and back and forth is the way that works.

Senator Ayotte. And I would totally agree with what Senator McCaskill said about--I think that families should get whatever information that you have, because they deserve this. And when you think about particularly our World War II veterans, I know it was just added to your statutory duties in 2010, but so many of them, obviously now, if you think about the family members, the spouses, we are getting to a point where we are losing so many of them. And I am sure that the urgency of providing this information to their families becomes even greater so that they can know and, obviously, just know whatever we know.

I am really blessed because my Grandfather is a World War II veteran. He is 97 years old. He is still with us. So I think about so many of them are not going to be with us, and I am sure their widows, as well. So there is an urgency to this, and whatever we know, they should know.

I also wanted to followup on this issue that, General, you had clarified and said originally, as a result of the 2010 NDAA as identified in the GAO report, there came up two different plans, one from DPMO, one from JPAC, and now you have settled on the JPAC plan and you are on the same page, as I understand it. But we have not received anything yet, have we, to my knowledge? Because I thought, ultimately, we were going to get that report.

General Winfield. Senator, we did not agree to the JPAC plan. Again, the requirement was to create a comprehensive, coordinated, integrated, fully funded program---

Senator Ayotte. Right.

General Winfield [continuing]. And the JPAC plan and the plan that was being forwarded by DPMO did not include all of those elements. Since we both---

Senator Ayotte. So we are not there yet?

General Winfield. Well, we have created a plan. It is our Capacity and Capabilities Plan. That is being formally coordinated within DOD as we speak. Once that coordination is complete, then we will be able to release it.

Senator Ayotte. So, when will we receive it?

General Winfield. I cannot put a time limit on how long it takes to get through all the coordination.

Senator McCaskill. What does that mean? What coordination?

Senator Ayotte. Yes, exactly. I do not know what coordination---

General Winfield. Yes. Any time we produce a product, it has to go through coordination with the different services, the Joint Staff, GCM, it goes--yes, ma'am, that is pretty much accurate. [Laughter.]

Senator McCaskill. You are killing me here.

Senator Ayotte. OK. So we need answers and we need leadership on this, and here is the opportunity. When I see both of you, General, Mr. Winfield, you have been in your positions for about a year--10 months, this is your opportunity. You have great challenges, but it is your leadership opportunity to get this right, and we want to see it, and we want to see it soon. So we are going to be following up on this with Dr. Miller and the Secretary because it is not clear to me, because, ultimately, I mean, it was the Congress who asked you for the report so that we can get this right, finally. So that is where our frustration comes from, as you can imagine.

General Winfield. And, Senator, it is important to note that the agreement was that we would nest the JPAC plan that was accepted and funded into the coordinated plan, and we did

exactly that. And I think General McKeague would agree that we did not lose any elements of his plan----

Senator Ayotte. Whoever is holding the plan right now, produce it.

General Winfield. Yes, ma'am.

Senator Ayotte. Up the chain of command. Keep going. Get it to us.

Senator McCaskill. Wherever it is ``nesting,'' we want it hatched.

Senator Ayotte. Yes. No more nesting. No more coordination, whatever. Let us see it.

And I wanted to followup, Mr. Winfield, while you are here, just to ask you about Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. As you know, he was captured by the Taliban in June 2009. I know it is, obviously, for his family, a very difficult and troubling and horrible situation, and just wanted to see where things were and what the Defense Department's efforts were there. I know it is very challenging.

General Winfield. Senator, again, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl has our--the Department of Defense's highest priority and we are working diligently. What we were working on for the last year is to ensure that there is a whole of government approach to trying to bring Sergeant Bergdahl home----

Senator Ayotte. Right, along with the State Department and----

General Winfield. Yes, ma'am, and that----

Senator Ayotte [continuing]. DOD, and I understand.

General Winfield. Yes, ma'am, and that is happening now.

Senator Ayotte. OK.

General Winfield. So, the effort is there, the focus is there, and we have the right people working to try to find information and to bring Bowe Bergdahl home to his mother and father.

Senator Ayotte. I just wanted to raise Sergeant Bergdahl in today's hearing so that people understand that he is very much on our mind----

General Winfield. Yes, ma'am.

Senator Ayotte. and from the highest levels of government, so thank you.

Senator McCaskill. I think the most important thing to remember is when you all go back to your jobs and you have one of those moments where something is supposed to go through a process, and that term ``coordination,'' which really means ``lost in a deep black hole at the Pentagon,'' when you are having those days that it has gone somewhere for somebody else's eyes and it is supposed to be back, I just want you to hear my voice ringing in your head. Get it frickin' done.

I mean, we are not going to be patient about this. This has been a problem for 20 years. And we want the plan. We want the reorganization of this effort so there are not so many cooks in the kitchen that are in charge, but there is one chef that we can blame. If the numbers are not there, if--and, by the way, it is going to help you get the resources you need, and when you speak with one unified voice, it makes your job so much easier.

Senator Ayotte. Please, hear my voice, too----

Senator McCaskill. Yes. I mean----

Senator Ayotte [continuing]. Because our voices will be together on this.

Senator McCaskill. This is going to be ridiculously hard for you, because we are like a dog with a bone on this stuff. So, you had better get used to this room because you are going to be back here a lot if we do not get dates and we do not get plans and we do not get something that does not look like a professor's test on organizational ability, how you do not do it. I mean, this would be a business class--this would be a case study of how you make sure that you do not get results and accountability.

And then, briefly, before we close here, I want to just ask about the JPAC lab in Nebraska. What purpose is this lab serving and how much does it cost?

General McKeague. Ma'am, we just opened the laboratory at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, in June of this year. It provides us the additional capacity and capability that was identified within the congressional mandate. It cost us a little over \$5.2 million. We ended up revitalizing and reusing an existing facility on the base, and that laboratory annex is up and running as of June 1.

Senator McCaskill. And are they performing identifications?

General McKeague. Ma'am, they have their first case. It is a case from Vietnam. It is a case of 10 disinternments from the cemetery in your home State and they are working on that case right now.

Senator McCaskill. Well, that is terrific, and I wanted to make sure that they were up and running. And I actually will tell you--I will leave on a positive note--\$5.2 million sounds like a reasonable number in the grand scheme of numbers that I look at constantly at the Department of Defense.

General McKeague. Yes, ma'am. It was a renovation of an existing facility, and, again, it provides us a state-of-the-art facility. I will caveat it that, because of the hiring freeze, we only have 14 of the 49 laboratory personnel in the building. But we are working with United States Pacific Command and DOD on that hiring issue.

Senator McCaskill. That is great.

Any other questions from you, Senator Ayotte?

Senator Ayotte. No. I may have some questions for the record. But as the Chair said, we will meet again, so thank you

all for being here and----

Senator McCaskill. And I know you all are really trying. I mean, our job is to do oversight. Our job is to hold your feet to the fire. Our job is to make you accountable, and we are going to do that. I understand that you do have a sacred mission. I understand that you are dedicated public servants, and we do not diminish that service in any way. But we want to get this fixed so that our successors years from now are not saying, well, why were these Senators so lame? They could not get it done when they tried----

Senator Ayotte. Right.

Senator McCaskill [continuing]. Back in 2013. Thank you all very much.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you, and thank you. I think you have great leadership opportunities here, as well, and your service records will bring--we thank you for your distinguished service records to be the right leader needed at the right time to get this right for the American people, so thank you.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

-----

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.001

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.002

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.003

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.004

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.005

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.006

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.007

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.008

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.009

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.010

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.011

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.012

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.013

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.014

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.015

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.016

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.017

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.018

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.019

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.020

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.096

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.021

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.022

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.024

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.025

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.026

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.023

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.027

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.028

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.029

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.030

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.031

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.032

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.033

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.034

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.035

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.036  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.037  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.038  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.039  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.040  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.041  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.042  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.043  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.044  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.045  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.046  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.047  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.048  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.049  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.050  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.051  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.052  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.053  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.054  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.055  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.056  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.057  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.058  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.059  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.060  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.061  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.062  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.063  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.064  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.065  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.066  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.067  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.068  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.069  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.070  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.071  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.072  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.073  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.074  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.075  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.076  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.077  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.078  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.079  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.080  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.081  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.082  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.083  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.084

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.085

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.086

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.087

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.088

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.089

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.090

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.091

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.092

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.093

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.094

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2747.095

→